Producer Cooperatives: a Transaction Cost Economic Approach by Gernet, H.
 
Producer cooperatives: a Transaction Cost Economic 
Approach 
 
 
Joana Rodrigues Pereira 
École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne  (EPFL CDM MTEI CSI),   
College of Management  
CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland 
joana.pereira@epfl.ch 
 
In F. Taisch, A. Jungmeister, and H. Gernet (Eds). Cooperative Identity and Growth. 
Conference Proceedings of ICCS 2016 in Lucerne. St. Gallen: Verlar Raiffeisen Schweiz, 
528-536. 
 
A longer version is available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2747355 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper aims at positioning producer cooperatives within the Transaction Cost Economics 
theory, one of the most cited and prolific theories on management studies. To accomplish this 
goal, I will answer the questions what is a cooperative, which transactions producer 
cooperatives regulate, under which market conditions they operate, and where are the 
boundaries for such organizations. This paper offers a comprehensive framework to study 
producer cooperatives, adopting a comparative institutional point of view, where producer 
cooperatives are compared with markets, firms and other hybrid types.  
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1. Introduction 
Despite the overall number of cooperatives relative to the private corporation population 
has always been small; cooperatives have been part of global economic life for more than 150 
years (Karantininis, 2007), playing an important role in the economy of several industrialized 
nations (Normak, 1996; Hansmann, 1999). Cooperatives constitute an enduring phenomenon, 
which is not small, neither marginal.  
While recent economic literature highlights the economic disincentives of cooperatives 
(Cornforth, 2004; O’Sullivan and Diacon, 2003; Hansmann, 1996; Williamson, 1985), and 
the sociologists defend their importance as social movements and expressions of individual 
and collective social identities (Schneiberg et al., 2008; Weber, Heinze, and DeSoucey, 2008), 
neither schools on their own are able to account for the contradictions that characterize the 
literature on cooperatives. If cooperatives are indeed inefficient forms of organizing, why do 
they exist at all in a market economy? Indeed, modern cooperatives compete in capitalist 
markets, and as Normak (1996) argued, there is no evidence that the cooperative enterprises 
are weaker than private firms in handling competitive markets; actually cooperatives compete 
often on highly competitive markets (Menard, 2007). 
These questions have been intriguing researchers from diverse fields, and this paper aims 
at contributing to this discussion. The goal is to analyze comparatively the conditions under 
which producer cooperatives are efficient organizational forms through the lenses of 
Transaction Cost Economics theory (TCE).  
In this paper, cooperatives are considered hybrid forms of organizing, since they present 
both market-like and firm-like mechanisms, such as agents’ autonomy (market-like), 
coordination, and centralized structures (firm-like) (Chaddad, 2012). Furthermore, producer 
cooperatives regulate transactions that present three main characteristics: first, the 
environment presents a medium uncertainty level, where disturbances’ frequency and 
variance remain at stable levels; second, the transactions present a medium/high frequency 
level and are regulated through long-term contracts; and third, the transactions present 
average levels of asset specificity, where members‘ side asset specificity balances with 
cooperatives‘ side asset specificity. Furthermore, producer cooperatives emerge to correct 
market failures through a more efficient allocation of resources, since under certain market 
failures they present comparative advantages to market and also to firms. The last point 
discussed in this paper was about producer cooperatives boundaries. Producer cooperative 
will tend to expand until the costs of coordinating an extra transaction within the centralized 
firm and between the members equals to the costs of carrying out the same transaction 
through markets or firms. 
In the following sections, I will develop the argument about producer cooperatives 
economic nature, types of transactions that producer cooperatives regulate, and market 
conditions under which they operate. The last sections will be dedicated to the boundaries of 
such organizations and to open some discussion points.  
2. Cooperatives as hybrid organizations 
The concept of governance structure is central to the theory of the firm. The idea that there 
are alternative ways to organize transactions goes back to Coase (1937), being later on 
followed by Williamson (1975), who formalized TCE theory. At the heart of TCE theory rely 
the assumptions that transactions entail uncertainty about their outcome because first, agents 
are opportunist (people tend to realize individual gains through a lack of candor or honesty in 
transactions); and second, agents possess bounded rationality (limits on the capacity of 
individuals to receive, store, and process information without error) (Williamson, 1973). To 
overcome uncertainty, under eminent opportunism and bounded rationality, agents implement 
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a governance structure that minimizes transaction costs (Williamson, 1981). For Coasians, 
there are two main governance structures: markets (regulated through price mechanisms) and 
firms/hierarchies (regulated through authority), which differ in their capacity to economize 
transaction costs (Williamson, 1981). In simple words, agents decide whether they buy in the 
market, which is regulated through price, or do it internally in the firms and in this case the 
transaction is regulated through authority/hierarchy. Later on, Williamson (1991) defined 
hybrids as intermediate governance form between markets (regulated through price 
mechanisms) and firms/hierarchies (regulated through authority). This model represented a 
major step towards a more comprehensive TCE theory, where a set of “weird” economic 
arrangements finally found theoretical coherence. This was also the case of cooperatives that 
found in hybrid form an opportunity to reinvent its nature (Menard, 2007; Ilioupolos, 2003; 
Chaddad, 2012). 
Iliopoulos (2003) and Menard (2007) have been building the argument that producer 
cooperatives are hybrid forms of organizing. According to the authors, cooperatives are 
formed to capture rents by pooling resources (Cook, 1993; Ilioupolos, 2003; Menard, 2007), 
what involves some form of low or high joint planning; their governance form is based on 
both formal and informal contracts for coordination among members (Shaffer, 1987; 
Ilioupolos, 2003; Menard, 2007); and they combine cooperation with competition, since they 
are autonomous identities that compete in the same market (Ilioupolos, 2003; Menard, 2007). 
Chaddad (2012) also contributes to economic nature of cooperatives discussion, arguing that 
producer cooperatives are ‘true hybrids’, since they possess market-like mechanisms 
(separated ownership and high powered incentives), and hierarchy-like instruments 
(administrative controls, authority and common staff in a central structure). Chaddad (2012) 
also reinforced that producer cooperatives display some unique attributes, as is the case of the 
democratic governance – one-person, one vote (Chaddad, 2012, Menard, 2007; Ilioupolos, 
2003).  
The idea that producer cooperatives are hybrids opens avenues to interpret this 
phenomenon through the lenses of TCE. The next sections analyze which type of transactions 
cooperatives should regulate and how they internally organize such transactions.  
 
3. What types of transactions do producer cooperatives regulate?  
To answer these questions, I will recall Williamson’s (1991) ‘discrete alignment principle’, 
which argues that calculative agents operating in a competitive environment will adapt the 
mode of organization that fits comparatively better with the attributes of the transaction at 
stake. Thus, governance structures are tailored to meet the specific needs of transaction 
attributes (Williamson, 1981) in order to minimize transaction costs. Therefore, the question 
is what are the attributes of transactions organized by producer cooperatives? And how do 
they differ from the ones organized by firms, markets and other hybrids? 
Williamson (1985) argued that transactions’ attributes vary across three dimensions: 
frequency – how frequent is the transaction; uncertainty level – internal and external 
disturbances; and asset specificity - the value of investment that will be lost in any alternative 
use.  
3.1. Transaction Frequency 
Transaction frequency refers to how frequent is the transaction. Frequency is important 
because the cost of conceiving, negotiating and re-negotiating contracts, which regulate 
transactions, can be very high. Therefore, there are situations where long-term contracts are 
desirable in order to avoid the cost of having several short-term contracts. However, under an 
ICCS/ IGT 2016    
uncertainty scenario, the longer the period of the contract, the more incomplete it tends to be 
(Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985).  
TCE predicts that firms should integrate transactions (regulate them through authority) 
when celebrating long-term contracts present high risk, due to uncertainty and asset 
specificity, and carrying several short-term contracts is too costly. On the other hand, markets 
are desirable to carry short-term low risk contracts, and hybrids middle/long-term contracts 
with medium risk.  
In the specific case of producer cooperatives, the transactions at stake (the ones that I am 
focused in) are between the cooperative and the members, and since members are suppliers, 
several transactions occur. These transactions can be more or less frequent (daily or seasonal 
depending on the industry), but are always repetitive. In producer cooperatives short-term 
contracts are replaced by long-term contracts in order to reduce costs. These long-term 
contracts differ from the firms’ contracts, since the parties remain independent, and no full 
integration occurs. However, they also differ from markets’ contracts since they present some 
coordination and control mechanisms between the agents. Cooperatives’ contracts also differ 
from bilateral hybrids’1 (strategic alliances and joint ventures) contracts since there is no end-
term. So, producer cooperatives regulate transactions that present a medium/high frequency, 
through long-term contracts where no end-term is stipulated.     
 
3.2. Transaction uncertainty 
Uncertainty refers to internal - problems in inputs, outputs, or transformation processes; 
and to external disturbances - shifts in institutional environment (political, social and legal) 
(Williamson, 1991; Menard, 2006). These disturbances can vary in terms of frequency – 
changes in the probability distribution of disturbance occurrence; and variance – changes in 
the level of disturbances’ consequences (Williamson, 1991). Higher the variance, more 
consequential are the disturbances, therefore higher is the level of coordination needed in 
order to adapt efficiently to the disturbance occurred. This will ultimately determine the 
efficiency of the different organizational forms (Menard, 1996). 
Markets are the favored form for low coordination, either the frequency is high or low, 
since each part adapts autonomously and no coordination is needed. However, as variance 
increases, more coordination is needed, and the propensity is higher to integrate the 
transaction in a firm hierarchy. In this way, hybrids are preferable when medium coordination 
is needed, but as disturbances increase in frequency and variance, this form increasingly loses 
efficiency advantages. It is important to highlight that in a scenario of more disturbances 
(frequency) and more consequential (variance), where coordination is needed, the efficacy of 
markets and firms may deteriorate, but the hybrid mode is arguably the most susceptible 
(Williamson, 1991) due to the difficulties to coordinate autonomous agents. 
In producer cooperatives, where members can ascend hundreds (Rothschild and Whitt, 
1986), coordination between these autonomous agents can assume very high costs. Therefore, 
producer cooperatives regulate transactions under a medium uncertainty environment, where 
disturbances’ frequency and variance remain at stable levels.  
 
3.3. Asset specificity 
Asset specificity is linked to the degree to which alternative users can redeploy an asset to 
alternative uses without sacrificing its value (Williamson, 1991). So, asset specificity reflects 
the value of investment that will be lost in any alternative use (Menard, 2006). As assets 
become more specific, the transaction takes a progressively stronger mutual dependence that 
                                                
1	  In this paper I will only consider bilateral hybrids such as strategic alliances and joint ventures, for simplification purposes. 
My reasons rely on the fact that this hybrid form is the most referenced on the TCE literature on hybrids.	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opens avenues for hold-up (Menard, 2006). In this scenario, the governance costs of markets 
increase, and firm integration is desirable (Williamson, 1981). Examples of asset specificity 
are physical assets (site specificity, physical specificity, and dedicated assets), human assets 
and brand name capital (Menard, 2006; Dnes, 1996; Lafontaine and Shaw, 1999).  
The impact of asset specificity is always interpreted in interaction with uncertainty. This 
happens because even if asset specificity is high, but uncertainty is low, it is possible to 
conceive complete contracts, and the risk for opportunism is low. However, when asset 
specificity is high and uncertainty is high too, opportunism may surge (Menard, 2006) and 
integration (firm) is desirable. On the other hand, when there is low asset specificity, markets 
enjoy advantages in both governance and production cost. Following this rationale, hybrids 
are preferable for medium level of asset specificity and uncertainty (Williamson, 1981).   
In producer cooperatives, asset specificity possess two components: member’s side asset 
specificity (individual level of investment to conclude the transaction with the cooperative), 
and cooperatives’ side asset specificity (members’ joint investment in the cooperative). 
Because members are autonomous, but at the same time they own the cooperative, we may 
observe opposing effects. TCE predicts that the higher the asset specificity, the higher the 
hold-up (opportunism) costs between parties. However, while member’s side asset specificity 
pulls members for hold-up, the investment that they made on the cooperatives’ asset 
specificity pushes them from holding-up. It is important to highlight that cooperatives’ side 
investments, due to cooperatives principles, cannot be transferable, so if the cooperative fails 
or if member exits from the cooperative, he loses the value (non-transferable and non-
redeployed), of what immediately leverage cooperatives side asset specificity levels.  
I defend in this paper that these two asset specificity levels (member’s side and 
cooperative’s side) should remain in balance, because if member’s side asset specificity is 
higher than cooperative’s side, the member has an incentive to hold-up, increasing costs, what 
leads to a loss of efficiency of the producer cooperative compared to firms. However, if 
cooperative’s side asset specificity is higher than member’s side, the member avoids holding-
up, accepting transactions conditions that are not optimal for him, what can make him incur in 
losses. So in order to maintain efficiency advantages over firms and markets, the cooperative 
side asset specificity should balance the member side in order to achieve optimal transactions 
conditions, and avoid inefficiencies losses. I also defend that the same logic exists in bilateral 
hybrids. Of course, this balance between sides asset specificity assumes more importance in 
governance structures with hundreds of members, due to a pure scale problem. So, producer 
cooperatives administrate transactions with average levels of asset specificity, where 
member’s side asset specificity balances with cooperative’s side asset specificity. 
 
 
4. Under what market conditions do producer cooperatives operate? 
Economic theories on cooperatives defend that cooperatives are created in an attempt to 
either correct or attenuate perceived market failures (Sexton and Iskow, 1988; Kenworthy 
1995; Hicks and Kenworthy, 1998; Cook, 1995). There are two main market failures that 
cooperatives address: abuses from monopolies, oligopolies, monopsonies and oligopsonies2 
(Normak, 1996; Cook, 1995), and markets inability to bundle relevant resources (Menard, 
2007).  
Coase (1937) argues that all forms of market failure can be attributed to transaction costs. 
This argument is aligned with the view that market failures are ultimately originated by 
inefficiencies in resource allocations, and can be solved or attenuated through a more efficient 
resource allocation mechanism. Williamson (1971) also argued that firms are able to correct 
                                                
2	  Oligopsnonies and Monopsonies represent a market structure where there are one or few buyers and several suppliers.	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market failures through integration, which ultimately reflect a more efficient allocation of 
resources. Therefore, firms exist because there is a cost in using market mechanisms (Coase 
(1937). These costs include finding relevant prices, haggling over prices, and concluding 
separate contracts for each transaction exchanged. Inside firms, price mechanisms are 
replaced by authority, transactions are not eliminated, but they are greatly reduced, as are the 
costs (Coase, 1937). Therefore, by internalizing transaction, firms avoid using market 
mechanisms and in this way reduce transaction costs, correcting/attenuating market failures. 
Cooperatives are composed by an association of members and by a centralized firm, whose 
owners are the members (Shaffer, 1987). Through this centralized firm, members are able to 
centralize several transactions upwards and downwards the supply chain. Some of them are 
for example, searching for relevant prices (see Kadoma, 2007; Bonus, 1986), haggling over 
prices with buyers and suppliers, and concluding several contracts (see Coase, 1937). Since 
members are able to centralize these activities in a firm, they are able to reduce their 
individual costs. These are the transaction costs that producer cooperatives are able to 
economize in comparison to markets, but what are the costs that producer cooperatives are 
able to economize compared to firms? My argument here is based on the rationale that all 
forms of organization are costly, and their respective advantages can be assessed only 
comparatively (Menard, 2006). Coase (1937) argued that firms exist because there is a cost in 
using market mechanisms; now I argue that there are also costs in opting by integrated firms. 
These costs include the drawbacks of integration, such as lost of flexibility (Menard, 2002), 
bureaucratic costs, and weak incentives (Menard, 2011; Williamson, 1991). Therefore, when 
compared to markets, cooperatives are able to economize in the search for relevant prices, in 
the haggling over prices with buyers and suppliers, and in the conclusion of several contracts; 
and compared to firms, cooperatives are able to reduce costs associated to integration (loss of 
flexibility, bureaucratic costs, and weak incentives) (Menard, 2002, 2011, Williamson, 1991). 
This rationale is aligned with Arrow’s (1969) argument that collective action can serve to 
economize on transaction costs.  
 
 
5. What are the boundaries for producer cooperatives? 
For TCE, a firm becomes larger as additional transactions are organized internally, and 
becomes smaller as the number of these transactions decrease (Coase, 1937). As a firm gets 
larger, the costs of organizing additional transactions within the firm may rise. Naturally, a 
point must be reached where the costs of organizing an extra transaction within the firm are 
equal to the costs involved in carrying out the transaction in the open market. Therefore, a 
firm will tend to expand until the costs of organizing an extra transaction within the firm 
become equal to the costs of carrying out the same transaction by means of an exchange on 
the open market (outsourcing) (Coase, 1937). 
The producer cooperative incentives and limitations for integrating one more transaction in 
the cooperative are similar to firm except for three factors: first, producer cooperatives are 
less likely to integrate into unrelated activities or into products that compete with products of 
members; second, the producer cooperative operates under a more limited access to capital for 
expansion (Shaffer; 1987); third, the calculus for coordination cost of a new transaction 
encompasses also the cost for coordinating members for one more transaction. Therefore, 
producer cooperatives integration decision (internalize transactions) is an equation with more 
variables and constraints than firms’ one. This ultimately explains why cooperatives are more 
conservative in terms of expanding boundaries.  
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Summarizing, producer cooperative will tend to expand until the costs of coordinating an 
extra transaction within the centralized firm and between the members become equal to the 
costs of carrying out the same transaction through markets or firms.  
 
 
6. Discussion 
This paper presents an attempt to study producer cooperatives through a pure TCE 
perspective. While existing research (Iliopoulos, 2003; Menard, 2007; Chaddad, 20012) 
focuses on hybrid organizations characteristics, I focus on understanding whether and when 
producer cooperatives achieve efficiency advantages over firms, markets and other hybrid 
forms. Therefore, producer cooperatives regulate transactions that are medium/high frequent, 
with medium levels of uncertainty, and average levels of asset specificity, where member’s 
side asset specificity balances with cooperative’s side asset specificity. Furthermore, producer 
cooperatives emerge to correct market failures through a more efficient allocation of 
resources, since under certain market failures they present comparative advantages to market 
and also to firms. 
The last section of this paper concludes the rationale for a complete/comprehensive TCE 
theory on producer cooperatives with the question what are the boundaries? Through an 
analogy with Coase (1937) argument for firms’ boundaries, I argue that producer cooperatives 
will tend to expand until the costs of coordinating an extra transaction within the cooperative 
and among the members become equal to the costs of carrying out the same transaction 
through markets, firms, or other hybrids. Further theoretical and empirical research is needed 
in this topic; this paper is just a step toward a more complete understanding of this intriguing 
phenomenon.  
Concerning the contributions or implications that this paper possesses for TCE, several 
points deserve our attention. The first point regards the expansion of the rationale that roots 
TCE. Until now, hybrid forms were a general category where all ‘weird’ organizational forms 
that are not firms or markets, are pushed.  In this paper, I made the point that hybrids between 
two partners (bilateral) are different from hybrids with hundreds of partners (multilateral), and 
in a comparative economic analysis, this scale factor makes a difference. The coordination 
costs to align 2 agents are certainly lower than aligning hundreds of agents ceteris-paribus. 
Therefore, such coordination costs can endanger the comparative efficiency of such 
governance mechanisms.  
Why is it so important to know more about these hybrids? It is important because they are 
more and more common in our society. As economy progresses, more and more alternative 
organizational structures surge and TCE is a powerful theory that has been contributing for a 
structural understanding of these ‘weird’ organizational forms.  
The nomination of 2012 as a Year of Cooperatives by United Nations is an attempt to shed 
light to the ‘cooperative solution’, mainly for developing countries. Several initiatives and 
incentives were designed in this direction. I hope this paper can help to design better 
incentives, elucidating when cooperatives should exist, and which transactions they should 
regulate. For practitioners, this paper also elucidates important aspects, such as when is it 
efficient to form a producer cooperative and what are the main efficiency/cost trade-offs.   
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